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TL;DR

Secretary Problem (Optimal Stopping): Observe the first n/e candidates, then hire the next one who beats all previous. This concept is essential for quantitative trading interviews and is frequently tested at top firms.

By Valenke Exam Prep Team·Last updated 2026-06-01
Game Theory

Secretary Problem (Optimal Stopping)

Observe the first n/e candidates, then hire the next one who beats all previous.

The secretary problem: You interview nn candidates sequentially. After each interview, you must immediately accept or reject (no callbacks). How do you maximize the probability of hiring the best? Optimal strategy: Reject the first n/e\lfloor n/e \rfloor candidates (observation phase). Then hire the first subsequent candidate who is better than all observed so far. Success probability: 1/e36.8%\approx 1/e \approx 36.8\% for large nn. Why 1/e1/e? Let rr be the cutoff. The probability that the best candidate is hired equals rnk=rn11k\frac{r}{n} \sum_{k=r}^{n-1} \frac{1}{k}. Optimizing over rr gives rn/er \approx n/e and probability 1/e\approx 1/e. Variations: - Minimize expected rank of hired candidate → different threshold - Multiple hires allowed → different strategy - Partial information → Bayesian updates When to use: Any optimal stopping problem where you see options sequentially and can't go back. House buying, job searching, parking problems.

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